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11. Introduction
During the ﬁrst decade after the creation of the European Monetary Union
(EMU), a number of member states initiated wide-ranging labor market re-
forms. These reforms tend to have stabilized output and employment during
the economic and ﬁnancial crises. For this reason, countries that are faced with
serious labor market imbalances, perceive reforms as the fastest way to restore
competitiveness. Some observers, nevertheless, see labor market reforms em-
bodying a beggar-thy-neighbor-policy3 leaving non-reforming countries with re-
duced competitiveness and increasing foreign debt exacerbating macroeconomic
imbalances within the currency union. Using a two-country, two-sector DSGE
model with search and matching frictions, we derive the impact of labor market
reforms not only for steady state output, employment and average real wages
but also for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks and the appearance of
foreign debt in non-reforming countries. This should contribute to the debate
on whether labor market reforms embody a beggar-thy-neighbor policy or add
to macroeconomic stability within the union.
The major problem faced by some of today's EMU member states in the
1990s was encompassed in the double-digit unemployment rates (Dreze and
Malinvaud, 1994; Bean, 1994; Layard et al., 1994; Lindbeck, 1996; Phelps,
1994). Because of labor market inﬂexibility, an increase in growth no longer
contributed to a strong increase in employment (Salvatore, 1998). Labor mar-
ket reforms should, therefore, increase ﬂexibility towards job-rich growth. By
the mid 2000s, a number of the EMU members had begun implementing these
reforms. Austria, Germany, Greece, France and Slovakia reduced the replace-
ment rate4 signiﬁcantly (by between 12.7 and 22.3 percentage points). Some
countries like Germany shifted resources from passive to active labor market
policies, intending to increase the eﬃciency of the labor market matching pro-
cess. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant number of countries trimmed down regulations
for temporary agency work, which then doubled in the following years in Aus-
tria, Germany and Denmark and tripled in Italy and Finland in the last decade.5
As some countries that imposed reforms in the 2000s were now experiencing less
unemployment, higher output stability and less foreign debt, as compared with
their non-reforming counterparts, the contribution of labor market reforms to
competitiveness and the current account was a controversial subject of discus-
sion.
In principle, there are two diﬀerent approaches which can be used to analyze
the link between labor market reforms and the current account balance. Most
3Felbermayr et al. (2012) demonstrate the economic rationale of this debate using tra-
ditional trade models and provide arguments for why this must not hold in modern trade
theory.
4The replacement rate is the percentage of a workers pre-unemployment income paid out
by an unemployment insurance company or as welfare upon the transition from work to
unemployment.
5Carone et al. (2009)provide an excellent overview of labor market reforms in Europe
2papers follow a direct approach that treats structural reforms as macroeconomic
shocks. There are at least three competing theories which explain why struc-
tural reforms, in particular labor market reforms, inﬂuence the current account
directly. The ﬁrst one sees structural reforms as to be painful today but to
promise future gains (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995). It would, therefore, be ratio-
nal for countries to borrow today in order to be compensated for the current pain
of structural reforms. Hence, the current account balance should decline in the
short run. However, since future gains of structural reforms will be used to pay
back the loans in the future, we should observe a reversal and a positive change
of the current account in the future. However, returns of reforms in the future
are uncertain. Another argument concerning the impact of structural reforms
on current account balances has been propagated by Kennedy and Slok (2005).
They argue that, in a ﬁrst step, wages and prices decline as result of structural
reforms. Hence, the country receives a price advantage and exports increase
and imports decline. As a result, the current account balance improves in the
short run. Proﬁtability increases with a time lag and the internal interest rate
increases. Investment goes up and foreign capital is attracted which, in turn,
tends to reduce capital exports and, therefore, goods exports. In the long run,
the current account surplus should thus decline. Bertola and Lo Prete (2009)
analyze the eﬀects of rising income growth and income risk as a result of labor
market deregulation. They argue in the same vein as Kennedy and Slok (2005)
that labor market deregulation should improve the current account balance of
the reforming country without much delay, since forward-looking individuals
increase their precautionary savings because of higher uninsurable risk. An-
other explanation for rising current account balances is that purchasing power
shifts towards individuals with higher saving propensities. Hence, the impact
of structural reforms on the current account balance is a priori not clear and
disputed in the empirical literature. In this context, Kennedy and Slok (2005)
analyze the role of structural policy reforms for the solution of global current
account imbalances for 14 OECD countries. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant but small
contribution of structural policy indicators to explain current account positions.
Chen et al. (2013), however, doubts a strong contribution of labor market re-
forms, arguing that the presence of asymmetric shocks results in strong current
account imbalances.
In this paper we follow an indirect approach that treats structural reforms
as a change in institutional settings rather than a shock. This adds to an
already growing literature analyzing the impact of labor markets reforms on
macroeconomic stability. In a closed economy model, Zanetti (2011) shows the
impact of decreasing replacement rates and ﬁring costs on the stability of the
economy and Krause and Uhlig (2012) discuss the eﬀect of labor market re-
forms in the presence of shocks to the discount factor. Mussa (2005) argues
that structural reforms aﬀect the adjustment capacity of the currency union as
a whole. Therefore, external balances will more easily readjust in the wake of
shocks in general such as the introduction of the single currency or of asymmet-
ric shocks manifesting themselves in diverging country-speciﬁc competitiveness
positions. This view goes far back to the seminal paper by Mundell (1961) on
3optimum currency areas as well as to more recent research, such as Pissarides
(1997) or Blanchard (2007). In this context, the application of supply-side ori-
ented measures (which directly lower the natural rate of unemployment) lowers
the magnitude of the demand shock necessary to reverse the eﬀect of an adverse
shock in the past (coercive power in the language of ferromagnetics, Blanchard
and Summers (1987)). Positive demand shocks lower the remanence of past
shocks. In other words, institutions which can be modiﬁed by reforms serve as
propagation mechanisms for shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). While the
impact of labor market reforms in the context of macroeconomic shocks receives
increasing attention, up to now, research on the inﬂuence of labor market re-
forms on the current account is scarce. In this context and relating to EMU, we
see essentially two open questions. Do labor market reforms, in the presence of
macroeconomic shocks, raise the current account deﬁcit of non-reforming coun-
tries, as a faster adjustment in some countries weakens the competitiveness of
others? Or do ﬂexible labor markets, in general, help to absorb shocks more
swifty which beneﬁts also non-reforming countries?
The contribution of this paper is to provide a two-county two-sector DSGE
model with search and matching frictions. This allows us to identify the contri-
bution of diﬀerent labor market reform measures to the current account deﬁcit
of non-reforming countries. Naturally, our model is not the ﬁrst one addressing
labor market frictions in a DSGE framework. Zanetti (2011) and Walsh (2005)
use a similar approach to include labor markets while Krause and Uhlig (2012)
analyze the German reduction of the replacement rate by using a model with
diﬀerent skill groups to focus on the impact of labor market reforms on high
versus low skilled workers. Krause and Lubik (2007), instead, introduce real
wage rigidities into a New Keynesian modeling framework distinguishing be-
tween sectors with high and low productivity. In addition to previous models,
we follow Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2007) and Ferrero et al. (2008) and include trade,
international borrowing and preferences for the consumption of home tradables
into a DSGE model with search and matching frictions. In this setting, house-
holds adjust consumption according to diﬀerences in the terms of trade so that
international borrowing gives rise to a current account deﬁcit or surplus. As
the labor market stance has an inﬂuence on prices and productivity, reforms
can have an impact on net exports and the current account. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model, the
third section describes the calibration of the model to a typical EMU member
state, the fourth section presents the steady state results, the reaction of the
model to diﬀerent shocks and some robustness checks. The ﬁfth section, ﬁnally,
concludes.
2. The model
We build a two-country, two-sector currency union model with search and
matching frictions in which a representative household maximizes lifetime utility
according to the rational expectations hypothesis. In each period the household
faces the decision whether to buy tradables from the domestic or the foreign
4economy, to buy non-tradables, to hold real money balances or to postpone
consumption until later by buying bonds. Foreign and domestic tradable as
well as non-tradable consumption goods sold by retailers are subject to staggered
price setting (Calvo, 1983). Following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), we
include the assumption of perfect risk sharing of households in a given economy
to be able to use a representative household setting. There are two sectors
of production in each country. For each sector, ﬁrms can be separated into
intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms and retailers. The trade speciﬁcation of
the model resembles that of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2007) and, more speciﬁcally,
Ferrero et al. (2008), with the exception that we impose staggered price setting
on the level of the retailers (Bernanke et al., 1999) rather than on the level
of intermediate good ﬁrms and that we assume a search and matching labor
market rather than staggered wage setting6.
Preferences of households are expressed by a nested utility function com-
bining, on the one hand, non-tradables and tradables using a Cobb-Douglas
function and, on the other hand, tradables from the domestic and foreign econ-
omy using a CES speciﬁcation. This setting is speciﬁed in a way which reﬂects
the fact that households have a preference for domestically produced products.
Additionally, the assumption of a home bias gives rise to a transfer eﬀect,
as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2007) call it, according to which a countries sees a
deterioration in its terms of trade if national expenditures decline.
In both sectors of the economy, we have nominal price rigidities. Given
irrevocably ﬁxed exchange rates due to our currency union setting, prices for
tradable goods are identical in both countries. In a steady state equilibrium,
trade is always balanced. During adjustments following macroeconomic shocks,
it might be, nevertheless, favorable for households of a given country to increase
imports and to run up debt. Financial markets are assumed to be imperfect in
the sense that only the bond of the domestic country is internationally tradable.
In our model, physical capital and labor are, at least in the short run, not
mobile between the two countries. As a result, the imbalances shown in our
model are more persistent than they would be in a model with factor mobility.
Within the European Monetary Union, labor markets are by no means closed.
We believe, nevertheless, that there is still a long road to go until we will have
full factor mobility materialized (Krause et al., 2014) so that, given the scope
of this paper, closed labor markets might be a not too bad approximation.
More speciﬁcally, the labor markets in our model build on the search and
matching model with endogenous job destruction developed by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) in which a worker and a ﬁrm in each period have to decide
whether to preserve or to terminate their relationship. Following Zanetti (2011),
Krause and Lubik (2007) and Walsh (2005), we embed the labor market speci-
ﬁcation of the Mortensen-Pissarides model by den Haan et al. (2000) in a New
Keynesian setting.
6Both deviations enable us to analyze labor market reforms as we include search and
matching frictions and endogenous job-separations.
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In each period, unemployed workers search for a job and intermediate goods-
producing ﬁrms want to ﬁll their vacancies. The matching function describes
the process of generating job matches by combining unemployed workers with
open vacancies. In contrast to Krause and Uhlig (2012), where a new match can
have a idiosyncratic productivity below the threshold level7, we assume that the
productivity of a new worker is always higher than the threshold. After a match
is generated, wage bargaining starts. After the ﬁrm and the worker have agreed
on a speciﬁc wage, training starts enabling the match to become productive in
the next period. At the beginning of each period, ﬁrm and workers are forced to
separate with a given probability due to disturbances exogenous to the model.
If a match survives exogenous separations, the ﬁrm is still able to choose to
post a vacancy or to keep the employee. As there are vacancy posting and
ﬁring costs for ﬁrms as well as search costs for workers, continuing a match
might generate a surplus. This surplus occurs if ﬁrms and workers observe a
productivity of the match that is above a threshold level at which the surplus is
zero. Firms that have an open position post vacancies as long as the value of the
vacancy is greater than zero. If the number of vacancies increases, however, the
probability of ﬁnding a convenient match decreases. This results in a reduction
of the expected value of an open position. In equilibrium, free market entry
ensures that the value of a vacancy is always zero.
In sum, the model economy is characterized by nominal rigidities in the
goods market and search and matching frictions in the labor markets. It consists
of a representative household, a production sector comprised of representative
intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms and a continuum of retail ﬁrms, indexed by
i, with i ∈ [0, 1] as well as a central bank for the monetary union.
2.1. The representative household
Our economy is inhabited by a large number of inﬁnitive living identical
households that are consuming Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) aggregates of domestic
and imported goods. Due to labor markets with search frictions, a household is
either employed or unemployed. In general, labor is supplied inelastically. As a
second source of income, households own shares of domestic ﬁrms and receive
dividends Dt from it. We assume that households in the domestic economy and
in the foreign country have the same preferences and endowments, deﬁned over a
composite consumption good Ct and real money holdings Mt/Pt. As described
by Merz (1995), we assume a perfect insurance system where households can
insure themselves against variations in income. This assumption removes het-
erogeneity among households within a given country and enables us to consider
the optimization problem of a representative household maximizing expected
lifetime utility. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the expected lifetime utility
function is given by
7The threshold productivity deﬁnes a speciﬁc idiosyncratic productivity, where a ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between continuing or separating a match.
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E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
lnCt + κm ln
(
Mt
Pt
)]
, (1)
where β with 0 < β < 1 represents the discount factor and κm denotes a scaling
parameter for utility from real money holdings with κm > 0. The consumption
index Ct is deﬁned as
Ct ≡ C
ι
T tC
1−ι
Nt
ι(1− ι) . (2)
Tradable goods CTt can be obtained from the domestic CHt or from the
foreign economy CFt while non-tradables CNt are produced at home, only.
CTt =
[
(1− α) 1γ CHt + α 1γC
γ−1
γ
Ft
] γ
γ−1
(3)
CHt, CFt, CNt are themselves consumption bundles containing varieties i
produced by retailers at home or abroad.
CHt =
(ˆ 1
0
CHt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
CFt =
(ˆ 1
0
CFt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
(4)
CNt =
(ˆ 1
0
CN,t(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
In this speciﬁcation, γ measures the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods, while  denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties
and τ stands for the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable
goods. The household chooses consumption, nominal money and bond holdings,
subject to the budget constraint
PtCt +Bt/Rt +Mt = Bt−1 + PtYt +Dt + %t +Mt−1. (5)
for t = 0, 1, 2..., where Pt denotes the price of a bundle of domestic tradable
and non-tradable and foreign tradable goods. At the beginning of period t, the
household receives a lump-sum transfer %t from the central bank and dividends
Dt from the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm. Total income
amounts to Yt. The household enters period t with bonds Bt−1 and Mt−1 units
of money. Furthermore, the bonds mature providing additional Bt−1 units of
money which are used to purchase Bt new bonds at the nominal cost Bt/Rt. Rt
denotes the nominal interest rate between t and t+1. Solving the intertemporal
optimization problem we derive the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
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Λt = C
−1
t (6)
Etβt,t+1 = Et
pit+1
Rt
(7)
κm
mt
= Λt − βEt Λt
pit+1
, (8)
where βt,t+1 = β˚tΛt+1/Λt is the stochastic discount factor with β˚t =
ςt
ψβCtt
as an
endogenous adjustment process that depends on consumption. The parameter
ψ is assumed to be small, the steady state discount factor isβ and the shock
term isςt. Real money holdings are deﬁned as mt = Mt/Pt . Combining the
ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Ct and Bt, (6) and (7), yields the standard
consumption Euler equation:
βEt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1
= Et
Pt+1
RtPt
. (9)
2.2. labor
We distinguish three diﬀerent employment statuses of the representative
household: Let Ut, W
N
t and Wt(at) denote the present-discounted value of an
unemployed, newly employed and continuously employed worker. In case of
unemployment, the worker enjoys real return b and expects to move into em-
ployment with probability ρj(θjt) and becomes employed either in the tradable
or in the non-tradable sector. Therefore, the present-discounted income stream
of an unemployed worker is
Ut = b+ Etβt,t+1
 2∑
j=1
ρj(θjt)W
N
j,t+1 + (1−
2∑
j=1
ρj(θjt))Ut+1
 . (10)
Following Pissarides (2000), the ﬂow value of being unemployed, b = h+ρww,
consists of the value of home production or leisure h and unemployment beneﬁts
ρww, where ρw represents the replacement ratio with 0 < ρw < 1 and w the
steady state average wage. The second part of equation (10) describes the
expected capital gain from a change of state.
The worker's value from holding a job with match productivity at is given
by
Wjt(ajt) = wjt(ajt)+Ejtβt,t+1
[
(1− ρx)
ˆ ∞
a˚jt+1
Wj,t+1dF (aj,t+1) + ρj,t+1Ut+1
]
.
(11)
Equation (11) states that an employed worker is paid a sector-speciﬁc wage
wjt(ajt) and that if the worker survives exogenous and endogenous job destruc-
tion, which happens with a total probability of ρt+1, the match will start to
produce goods.
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The present-discounted value of a new match is
WNjt = w
N
jt+Ejtβt,t+1
[
(1− ρx)
ˆ ∞
a˚j,t+1
Wj,t+1(aj,t+1)dF (aj,t+1) + ρj,t+1Uj,t+1
]
.
(12)
Please note, that equation (12) diﬀers from (11) in the wage of new workers,
only. The wage of new workers, wNt , will be diﬀerent from the wage of continuing
workers, wt(at) due to the presence of ﬁring costs that a ﬁrm has to bear if it
decides to ﬁre a worker. As in the ﬁrst period, no endogenous job destruction
takes place, ﬁring costs in this period do not inﬂuence the wage of new workers.
2.3. International risk sharing
Due to the assumption of complete securities markets, a ﬁrst-order condition
analogous to equation (9) must hold for the foreign country8
βEt
[(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)
QtP
∗
t+1
Qt+1P ∗t
]
= Rt (13)
with a star denoting foreign variables and the real exchange rate Qt ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
as the
ratios of CPIs expressed in a common currency. Using this deﬁnition, we can
combine equations (9) and (13) and express after iterating home consumption
in terms of foreign consumption and the real exchange rate
Ct = υC
∗
t . (14)
2.4. Labor market ﬂows and matching
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the representative intermediate goods-
producing ﬁrm posts one vacancy and recruits one worker before production
occurs. Each single job has the status ﬁlled or vacant. Due to matching frictions,
it is assumed that the process of job search and hiring is time-consuming and
costly for both the worker and the ﬁrm.
8Please note that we assume that the law of one price holds throughout, implying that
PF,t(i) = εtP
∗
F,t(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1] , where t is the nominal exchange rate and P ∗F,t(i) is the
price of foreign produced good i in terms of the foreign currency. As the nominal exchange
rate is ﬁxed in a currency union, we get PF,t(i) = P
∗
F,t(i). A similar relationship holds for
goods produced in the domestic economy PH,t(i) = P
∗
H,t(i). Integrating over all goods allows
us to obtain PF,t = P
∗
F,t and PH,t = P
∗
H,t. As we have preferences for the consumption of
home goods in all countries, we deﬁne a real exchange rate as Qtt ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
. Because of similar
preferences, the equilibrium domestic price of a riskless bond issued in foreign currency is
given by R∗−1t = Et {βt,t+1, Qt}. As we know from the ﬁrst-order condition of household
utility maximization, the domestic bond pricing equation is R−1t = Et {βt,t+1}. We can
combine both equations to get a currency union version of the uncovered interest parity
condition Et {βt,t+1 [Rt −R∗t (Qt/Qt+1)]} = 0. For a paper on exchange rate volatility and
labor markets see Belke and Kaas (2004).
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If a ﬁrm ﬁnds a suitable worker, both form a match. The number of job
matches depends on the matching function mjt(ut, vjt), where vjt denotes the
number of vacancies in both sectors of the economy, tradable and non tradable
goods j = tr, nt and ut is the number of unemployed workers. We assume a
Cobb-Douglas matching function
mjt(ut, vjt) = χu
ξ
tv
1−ξ
jt , (15)
where 0 < ξ < 1 and χ is scale parameter reﬂecting the eﬃciency of the matching
process. Deﬁning the labor market tightness as θjt = vjt/ut and making use of
the CRS property of mjt, we write the job ﬁnding probability of an unemployed
worker as
p(θjt) = mjt(ut, vjt)/ut = χθ
ξ
jt, (16)
and the probability that a searching ﬁrms will ﬁnd a worker is given by
q(θit) = mit(uit, vit)/vit = χθ
1−ξ
it . (17)
The tighter the labor market, the easier it is for unemployed workers to ﬁnd a
job. Equation (17) implies that the higher the number of vacancies vjt for a
given number of unemployed workers, ut, the more diﬃcult it is for ﬁrms to ﬁll
vacant positions.
At the beginning of any period t, job separations take place as a result of an
exogenous negative shock with probability ρxj . Firms may decide to dissolve a
match endogenously if the realization of the worker's idiosyncratic productivity
of ajt is below a certain threshold productivity a˚jt. The probability of endoge-
nous job destruction is given by ρnjt = P (ajt < a˚jt) = F (˚ajt). The total job
separation rate, therefore, is ρjt = ρ
x
j +(1−ρxj )ρnjt. As in den Haan et al. (2000),
the idiosyncratic productivity ajt is drawn from a log-normal distribution with
mean µln and standard deviation σln.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), new matches have a productiv-
ity of aNjt which ensures that their productivity is always above the produc-
tivity threshold a˜jt, and that all jobs produce before being destroyed. New
matches in t, mjt, become productive for the ﬁrst time in t+ 1. Consequently,
the employment in each sector evolves according to njt = (1 − ρjt)njt−1 +
mjt−1(ut−1, vjt−1). The number of unemployed persons is ut =
(
1−∑2j=1 njt).
2.5. The representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm
In each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms post va-
cancies at cost cj and hire workers. Labor is the only input in the production
function. At the beginning of each period, old and new matches draw a id-
iosyncratic, job-speciﬁc productivity ajt. Production in each sector is subject
to an aggregate productivity shock, Ajt, common to all ﬁrms. If the realization
of the worker's idiosyncratic productivity is above the reservation productivity
a˚jt, ﬁrms will produce output using labor yjt = Ajtajt. The aggregate produc-
tivity Ajt follows an AR(1) process, ln(Ajt) = ρjA ln(Ajt−1) + jAt , where ρjA
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is the serial correlation coeﬃcient with 0 < ρjA < 1 and Ajt follows a white
noise process with standard deviation σjA.
We deﬁne the present-discounted value of expected proﬁts from a vacant job
as follows:
Vjt = −cj + Etβt,t+1
[
qj(θjt)J
N
jt+1 + (1− qj(θjt))Vjt+1
]
. (18)
With probability of qj(θjt), the ﬁrms matches with a worker and the match
yields a return of JNjt+1. With probability 1 − qj(θjt), the job remains vacant
with a return of Vjt+1. As long as the value of a vacancy is greater than zero,
ﬁrms will post new vacancies. In equilibrium, free market entry drives the proﬁt
from opening a vacancy to zero, which implies Vjt = 0 for any t. This yields the
vacancy posting condition
cj
qj(θjt)
= Etβt,t+1J
N
jt+1, (19)
which states that the expected cost of hiring a worker, cj/qj(θjt), is equal to
the expected proﬁt generated by a new match.
The value of a newly hired worker enjoyed by the ﬁrm is given by
JNjt = mcjtAjta
N
jt − wNjt
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )
[´∞
a˚jt+1
Jjt+1(ajt+1)dFj(ajt+1)− Fj (˚ajt+1)Tj
]
,
(20)
where mcj denotes the sector-speciﬁc real marginal costs of providing one ad-
ditional unit of output. We distinguish between endogenous and exogenous
separations. With probability 1 − ρxj , the worker survives exogenous job de-
struction. For a surviving match, a realization of the idiosyncratic productivity
below the critical threshold a˚jt+1 leads to endogenous separation and the ﬁrm
incurs ﬁring costs Tj .
Similarly, the present-discount value of a continuing job with productivity
ajt to the employer is
Jjt(ajt) = mcjtAjtajt − wjt(ajt)
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )
[´∞
a˚jt+1
Jjt+1(ajt+1)dFj(ajt+1)− Fj (˚ajt+1)Tj
]
(21)
In equations (20) and (21) the term mcjtAjtajt − wjt(ajt) represents the net
return of a match, and Jjt+1 − Fj (˚ajt+1)Tj represents the present-discounted
ﬁrm surplus, if the match is not destroyed.
In this model, an expression for the real marginal cost mcjt can be derived
by using equation (11) and the condition that a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
continuing a match or separating from the worker, Jjt(˚a) + Ti = 0 (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 2003). Combining these two equations and solving for mcjt, we
obtain:
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mcjt =
1
Ajta˚jt(
wjt(˚ajt)− Etβt,t+1
[´∞
a˚jt+1
Jjt+1(ajt+1)dFj(ajt+1)− Fj (˚ajt+1)Tj
]
− Tj
)
(22)
From equation (22), it can be seen that the real marginal costs amount to the
wage minus the expected future return generated by the match and the ﬁring
costs, weighted by the marginal product of labor. As pointed out by Trigari
(2009), the real marginal costs are, in the presence search and matching frictions,
not equal to the wage divided by the marginal product of labor. Instead they
also depend on the expected present-discounted payoﬀ of preserving a match,
which internalizes the ﬁring costs.
2.6. Wage bargaining
In each period, ﬁrms and workers bargain over the real wage for the current
period, regardless of whether they form a continuing or a new match,. The wage
is set according to Nash bargaining. The worker and the ﬁrm share the joint
surplus and the worker receives the fraction η ∈ [0, 1]. Since the wage depends
on the idiosyncratic productivity of the worker, the wage bargaining rules for
new and continuing matches are given by
η(Jjt(ajt) + Tj) = (1− η)(Wjt(ajt)− Ujt) (23)
and
ηJNjt (ajt) = (1− η)(WNjt − Ujt), (24)
respectively. The bargaining rule for continuing workers, represented by equa-
tion (23), internalizes ﬁring costs Tj , whereas new workers are not subject to
ﬁring costs because in the period they are hired, their idiosyncratic productivity
aNjt is assumed to be above the critical threshold a˚jt.
We can now derive the wage for continuing workers by using the Bellman
equations (10)-(13), (15)-(16) and the bargaining rules for continuing and new
matches, (17) and (18)
wjt(ajt) = η [mcjtAjtajt + cθt + (1− ζjt)Ti] + (1− η)bj . (25)
The agreed wage for new workers is equal to
wNjt = η
[
mcjtAjta
N
jt + cθt − ζjtTj
]
+ (1− η)bj , (26)
where ζjt = Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj ).
The wage that new and continuing workers receive consists of two elements.
First, if ﬁrms have complete bargaining power, the optimum wage would be the
slightly above the beneﬁts from unemployment bj , which includes unemployment
insurance payments and welfare captured by the replacement rate as well as the
utility derived from not working. Second, if workers have complete market
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power, the wage would be slightly less than the match revenue mcjtAjtajt, plus
the saved hiring costs, cjθjt, minus the present-discounted ﬁring costs, ζjtTj ,
and plus the savings on ﬁring costs, Tj , in the case of continuing workers. In
the case where the bargaining power of ﬁrms and workers is between those two
extremes, the bargaining power of workers η attaches weight to the two elements.
It follows from equation (26) that the wage of new workers does not include
ﬁring costs related to endogenous job separations in the initial period. Firing
costs are assumed to be sunk. Lazear (1990) shows that any mandated severance
payment can be oﬀset by an eﬃcient labor contract and, hence, ﬁring costs do
not impose no real eﬀects.
2.7. Retail ﬁrms
We assume a continuum of monopolistic competitive retailers on the unit
interval indexed by i. Each retailer purchases goods from the intermediate
goods-producing ﬁrms and transforms it into a diﬀerentiated retail good using
a linear production technology. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . a retailer
j of sector i = H,F,N sells Yit(j) units of the retail goods, at the nominal
price Pit(j). Let Yit denote the composite of individual retails goods which is
described by the CES aggregator of Dixit and Stiglitz (1975):
Yit =
[ˆ 1
0
Yit(j)
(γ−1)/γdj
]γ/(γ−1)
, (27)
where γ with γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the diﬀerentiated
retail goods. Then, the demand curve facing each retailer j is given by
Yit(j) =
[
Pit(j)
Pit
]−γ
Yit, (28)
where PHit is the aggregate price index
Pit =
[ˆ 1
0
Pit(j)
1−γdj
]1/(1−γ)
(29)
for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . As in Calvo (1983), only a randomly and independently
chosen fraction 1−ν of the ﬁrms in the retail is sector is allowed to set its prices
optimally, whereas the remaining fraction ν adjust its prices by charging the
previous period's price times the steady state inﬂation. Hence, a retail ﬁrm j,
which can choose its price in period t, chooses the price Pˆit(j) to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βν)jβt,t+s
( Pˆit(j)
Pit+s
)−γ
Yit+j
(
Pˆit(j)
Pit+s
−mcit+s
) , (30)
where βt+s is the discount factor used by the ﬁrms and mcit is the real marginal
costs. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
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Pˆit(j) =
γ
(γ − 1)
∞∑
s=0
(νβ)jEt(λit+sP
γ
it+sYit+smcit+s)
∞∑
s=0
(νβ)jEt(λit+sP
γ−1
it+sYit+s)
. (31)
2.8. The central bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a modiﬁed Taylor
(1993) rule
ln (Rt/R¯) = ρr ln(Rt−1/R¯) + ρy
(
δ ln(Yt/Y¯ ) + (1− δ) ln(Y ∗t /Y¯ ∗)
)
,
+ρpi
(
δ ln(piH,t/p¯iH) + (1− δ) ln(pi∗F,t/p¯i∗F )
)
+mprt
(32)
where R¯, Y¯ and p¯iH , p¯i
∗
F are the steady state values of the gross nominal interest
rate, output and gross inﬂation rate for domestically and foreign-produced goods
and mprt
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2rt) is a shock to monetary policy. The of the degree of
interest rate smoothing ρr and the reaction coeﬃcients to inﬂation and output,
ρpi and ρy, are positive.
2.9. Trade
The real value of net exports is deﬁned using the weighted diﬀerence between
home production and tradable consumption NX ≡ PHtYHt−PTtCTtPt . Using this
deﬁnition, we specify total nominal bond holdings Bt according to
Bt
Pt
=
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+NX. (33)
The net change of real bond holding reﬂects the current account CAt ≡
Bt−Bt−1
Pt
.
Given two sectors in each economy, it is convenient to deﬁne a set of relative
prices. The relative price of non-tradables to tradables is deﬁned as Xt ≡
PNt/PTt and the terms of trade as > ≡ PFt/PHt. Using these deﬁnitions and
their foreign counterparts gives us the expression of the real exchange rate in
terms of the relative price of non-tradables to tradables and the terms of trade
Qt =
[
α>1−γ + (1− α)
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] 1
1−γ (X∗t
Xt
)1−η
. (34)
2.10. Domestic equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium, the value of an open vacancy is zero in both sectors. Making
use of the vacancy posting condition (19), combined with equations (20) and
(26), yields the job creation condition
cj
qj(θjt)
= (1− η)Etβt,t+1
[
mcjt+1Ajt+1(a
N
jt+1 − a˚jt+1)− Ti
]
. (35)
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Equation (35) states that the expected hiring cost that the ﬁrm has to pay
must be equal to the expected gain from a ﬁlled job. Jobs are destroyed by the
ﬁrm when the realization of the worker's productivity is below the reservation
productivity. The reservation productivity is deﬁned as the value of ajt, which
makes the ﬁrm's surplus received from a job equal to zero,
Jjt(˚ajt) + Tj = 0. (36)
The job destruction condition is derived using equations (21), (25) and (36)
and is given by
mcjtAjt˚ajt − bj − η(1−η)cθt + (1− ζjt)Tj = 0
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )mcjt+1Ajt+1
´∞
a˚jt+1
(ajt+1 − a˚jt+1)dF (ajt+1)
. (37)
with cθt representing the average hiring costs of all ﬁrms in the two sectors
of the economy.
As in Zanetti (2011), the equilibrium average real wage is a weighted average
of continuing workers with weight ωCjt = (1−ρjt)njt−1njt while that for new workers
is 1− ωCjt. Therefore, the average real wage is
wjt = η
[
mcjtAjtajt + cθt + (ω
c
jt − ζjt)Tj
]
+ (1− ηj)b, (38)
where ajt = ω
C
jtH (˚ajt) + (1 − ωCjt)aNjt is the average idiosyncratic productivity
across jobs and H (˚ajt) = E(ajt|ajt > a˚jt) =
´∞
a˚jt
afj(aj)
1−Fj (˚aj)da represents the aver-
age productivity for continuing workers. The aggregate output, net of vacancy
costs, amounts to
yjt = njtAjtajt − cjtvjt. (39)
Both, home and foreign non-tradable consumption must equal demand
YNt = CNt Y
∗
Nt = C
∗
Nt,
as must home tradable production
YHt = CHt + C
∗
Ht,
with C∗Ht as demand of home tradable goods from abroad. Combining this
relation with equation (33) implies that the foreign trade balance in units of
home consumption QtNX
∗
t must equal the negative home trade balance NXt.
Now we make use of the market clearing condition for home production and
include the demand functions for home produced tradables, the deﬁnition of the
real exchange rate and the deﬁnition of the terms of trade and the relative price
of non-tradables to tradables which yields
YHt = α
[
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] γ
1−γ
CTt+(1− α)
[
α>1−γt + (1− α)
] γ
1−γ
C∗Tt. (40)
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For domestic and foreign non-tradables we get
YNt =
1− η
η
(Xt)
η−1
CTt Y
∗
Nt =
1− η
η
(X∗t )
η−1
C∗Tt.
Given that bond-markets clear, we are able to get an expression for net
exports in terms of non-tradable to tradable prices and the terms of trade
NXt = (Xt)
η−1
{[
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] 1
1−γ
YHt − CTt
}
and
−NXt
Qt
= (Xt)
η−1
{[
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] 1
1−γ
YHt − CTt
}
.
Furthermore, the current account can be expressed as
CAt = (Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1
Pt
+NXt.
Finally we can express tradable consumption in terms of aggregate consump-
tion for the home and foreign country
CTt = γ (Xt)
1−γ
Ct C
∗
Tt = γ (Xt)
1−γ
C∗t .
In the steady state equilibrium, the household's bonds and money holdings
are Bt = Bt+1 = 0 and Mt = Mt+1 = 0, which ensures that any seigniorage
revenue is rebated to the households. Furthermore, international ﬁnancial mar-
kets must clear, which implies that Bt + B
∗
t = 0, where B
∗
t represents nominal
bond holdings of domestic assets by foreign households.
2.11. The log-linearized model
We now derive the log-linear equations for the domestic economy. A sym-
metric set of equations speciﬁes the economy of the foreign country. The log-
linearized version of the model is derived through a ﬁrst-order Taylor approxi-
mation, while variables with a tilde denote the log-deviations from a determin-
istic steady state. From the household's utility maximization, we can derive a
log-linearized Euler equation
c˜t = Et {c˜t+1} −
(
r˜t − Et {p˜it+1} − βˆt
)
,
and money demand from equation (8)
m˜Ht − p˜t = σmy˜t +
(
1− 4¯
4¯
)
σm (rˆt − rˆmt ) ,
where βˆt denotes the log of the endogenous time-discount rate, p˜it ≡ p˜t−p˜t−1
represents the log CPI inﬂation and the log diﬀerential in interest rates on assets
and money is given by 4¯ = 1 − β (1− r¯m). The price of a consumption good
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bundle p˜t consists of prices for home-produced goods p˜Ht and goods produced in
the rest of the currency union p˜F,t. The log interest rate diﬀerential is given by
rˆmt = log (1 + rˆ
m
t /1 + r¯
m), with r¯m being the steady state zero inﬂation interest
rate.
The endogenous discount factor depends negatively on consumption accord-
ing to
βˆt = ςt − ψβc˜t,
where ςt denotes an exogenous shock to the discount factor that obeys an
autoregressive process. We, nevertheless, assume that ψ is small so that the
eﬀect is negligible on medium-term dynamics.
The demand of home tradables depends on the non-tradable to tradable
price relation and on the terms of trade
y˜Ht = 2α(1− α)γτ˜t + (1− η) [αx˜t + (1− α)x˜∗t ] + αc˜t + (1− α)c˜∗t .
To derive this equation, we used the tradables consumption to aggregate
consumption relation and the equations (14) and (40). We derive the demand
for non-tradables using the market clearing condition and the relation of non-
tradables to aggregate consumption, which also depends on the non-tradables
to tradables price relation
y˜Nt = −γx˜t + c˜t.
We now relate the terms of trade and the non-tradable to tradable price
relation to CPI inﬂation and home prices for both domestic as well as foreign-
produced tradable goods
τ˜t = τ˜t−1 + (4q˜t + p˜i∗Ft − p˜it)− (p˜iHt − p˜it),
x˜t = x˜t−1 + p˜iNt − p˜iHt − η(1− α)4τ˜t.
The price of domestically produced goods, nevertheless, is subject to labor
market imperfections. If we now log-linearize equation (31) around the steady
state, we can derive two New Keynesian Philips Curves
p˜iHt = βEtp˜iHt+1 +
(1− ν)(1− νβ)
ν
m˜cTt, (41)
p˜iNt = βEtp˜iNt+1 +
(1− ν)(1− νβ)
ν
m˜cNt.
where m˜cjt is deﬁned as the log-deviation of marginal costs from their steady
state value µ. Marginal costs m˜cjt are derived using a log-linear ﬁrst-order
approximation of (22). In general, CPI depends on home and foreign prices as
well as the terms of trade
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p˜it = µp˜iHt + (1− µ)p˜iNt + µ(1− α)4τ˜t.
Net exports depend on the diﬀerence of time-varying discount factors, the
terms of trade and expected future net exports
n˜xt = (1− α)βˆR,t − 2α(1− α)(µ− 1)Et4τ˜t+1 + Etn˜xt+1.
Net indebtedness evolves from previous trade imbalances and net exports in
the current period
b˜t =
1
β
b˜t−1 + n˜xt.
Given the indebtedness of the economy, we can express the current account
as
c˜at = b˜t − 1
1 + g
b˜t−1,
with cat denoting the current account normalized by steady state growth.
From the labor market equilibrium, we get the log-linear average real wage
per sector
w˜jt =
1
w¯j
[
ηm¯cjA¯j a¯j
(
m˜cjt + A˜jt + a˜jt
)
+ cθ¯θ˜t + T˜j
(
ω¯jω˜jt + β(1− ρx)β˜t,t+1
)]
with % = ηεAaw , the job creation condition
θ˜jt =
1
ξ
[
(1− η)βm¯cj(a¯jN − ¯˚ja)
(
χj
cj θ¯j
ξ
)
EtΩ1 + β˜t,t+1
]
, .
Ω1 =
(
m˜cjt+1 + A˜jt+1 − a¯i
a¯Nj − ¯˚ja
˜˚ajt+1
)
and the job destruction condition
θ˜jt =
(
η
1-η
)
cθθ˜t
[
m¯cjA¯jΩ2 + β(1− ρx)T˜jEtβ˜t,t+1
]
,
Ω2 =
 ¯˚ja
(
m˜cjt + A˜jt + ˜˚ajt
)
+ β(1− ρx) (H( ¯˚ja)− ¯˚aj)
Et
(
β˜t,t+1 + m˜cjt+1 + A˜jt+1 +
¯˚
ja
H( ¯˚ja)− ¯˚ja
˜˚ajt+1
)

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2.12. Monetary policy
In our model, we assumed a currency union with a common monetary policy.
In this case, the central bank targets inﬂation and output stability for the whole
currency union
r˜t = ρr r˜t−1 + ρy [δy˜∗t + (1− δ)y˜t] + ρpi (δp˜i∗t + (1− δ)p˜it) + rt , (42)
where δ attaches weights to the importance of the economy in the monetary
policy function and rt
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2rt) is a shock to monetary policy. The de-
gree of interest rate smoothing ρr and the reaction coeﬃcients to inﬂation and
output, ρpi and ρy, are all positive.
3. Calibration
Household preferences are characterized by seven parameters, the steady
state discount factor, the value of leisure, the partial elasticities for tradables
and non-tradables, the elasticities of substitution between home and foreign-
produced tradables, the home bias and the elasticities of substitution for vari-
eties of a good. The periods of the model are calibrated to be quarters and we
assume both countries and both sectors to be symmetric. Parameters, there-
fore, are the same if not indicated otherwise. The steady state discount factor,
therefore, is assumed to have the value β = .99 which implies an annual steady
state interest rate of 4 per cent. In the literature there exists a variety of def-
initions distinguishing tradables from non-tradables. We follow the traditional
approach in assigning manufacturing, business services, ﬁnancial services and
tourism to the tradables sector. Given this deﬁnition, the size of the tradable
sector for France is slightly higher than 41 per cent of GDP; for Italy the share is
slightly higher than 45 per cent; while Germany has the highest tradable share
of 49 per cent. Southern EMU countries, however, have much lower tradable
shares. Given these values, we set the steady state share of the tradable sector
to ι = .40, which is roughly in-line with the share of tradables of EMU coun-
tries. We follow, furthermore, Ferrero et al. (2008) in setting the preference
share parameter to α = 0.7 and the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign tradables to γ = 2.0. Using a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, we impose
a unit elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables, which is
the benchmark case in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2007).
We calibrate the labor market of the model to reproduce the structural char-
acteristics of a typical EMU country. The unemployment rate is set to u = 9.5
per cent, which is the long-term average among EMU countries. We choose
a job separation rate of ρ = 1.2 given estimates of between 0.7 per cent for
Germany and 1.9 per cent for Denmark (Hobijn and Sahin, 2007). Given these
two values, the probability of a worker ﬁnding a job in any period is qj = .37
per cent. However, this ﬁgure varies signiﬁcantly among countries within EMU.
For German workers, the probability of ﬁnding the next job is 57 per cent while
it is 18 per cent for Spain so we took a medium value. Using the calibrated
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probabilities, we derive a exogenous separation rate of ρx = 0.02 . Unfortu-
nately, the data do not contain information on the share of the endogenous and
exogenous separation in the total separation rate, which, therefore, has to be
calibrated using the job creation and job destruction function. The reservation
productivity threshold of a˜ = 4.14 is calculated at the steady state intersection
of the job destruction and job creation curve. We follow den Haan et al. (2000)
in assuming the idiosyncratic productivity to be log-normally distributed. As
Germany is the biggest country in the Eurozone, we mimic the wage distribu-
tion of this country, which we have calculated using SOEP data. The mean
of F (.), therefore, is calibrated to be µln = 2.54 and the value of its standard
deviation equal to σln = 0.48. We, furthermore, assume that the productivity
of new matches is always in the 0.95th percentile of F (.) and therefore always
above the threshold productivity an > a˜ which implies that new matches never
separate.
We follow Burgess and Turon (2010) in setting the matching rate of ﬁrms
to qj(θjt) = 0.9. The elasticity of a match is calibrated to be ξ = .7 based on
the estimates of Bean (1994) and in-line with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We calibrate the level parameter of the matching function χ in a way that we
replicate the steady state number of matches. As standard in the literature, the
Nash bargaining coeﬃcient used in the wage-setting equation is set to µ = 0.5
such that workers and ﬁrms have the same bargaining power. The vacancy
posting costs in the baseline scenario c = 7.82 and the unemployment beneﬁts b
are inferred from the steady state job destruction and cob-creation conditions.
The parameter measuring leisure is calibrated to h = 1.78, a value calibrated
using the calibrated realization of w and b. Firing costs T are set to .67 per cent,
which is calculated as EMU average using the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database, while the replacement rate is ρu = .5 cent of the mean wage.
According to the dataset of Vliet and Caminada (2012), most EMU countries
have a replacement rate between 0.5 and 0.6 per cent, while Portugal has the
highest (78 per cent) and Malta the lowest value(30 per cent) .
As it is common in the literature, the parameter measuring the market power
of intermediate good ﬁrms is set to ε = 11. This implies a mark-up over marginal
costs of 10 per cent and reﬂects empirical ﬁndings. The Calvo parameter that
governs the frequency of price adjustments is, in accordance with Taylor and
Woodford (1999), set to ν = 0.75 such that the average binding of prices is 4
quarters. As common, we normalize steady state inﬂation to 1. The Taylor rule
is calibrated following Taylor and Woodford (1999) implying a monetary policy
response to inﬂation equal to ρpi = 1.5, a response to a change in output of
ρy = .5 and a degree of interest rate smoothing of ρr = .32.
Finally, we specify the shock processes. In line with most of the literature,
we calibrate the productivity shock such that the baseline model replicates the
standard deviation of output of European countries, which is on average 1.08.
The standard deviation of the shock, consequently amounts to σa = 0.0045 and
the shock persistence parameter is ρa = 0.94.
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4. Results
In this section we present the results of our simulation exercise. In the ﬁrst
subsection, we show the impact of three reform measures, a reduction of vacancy
posting costs, more eﬃcient placement and a lower replacement rate on the four
sectors of our two-economy model. In the second subsection, we will discuss the
impulse response functions (IRF) showing the adjustment of the economy after
a transitory shock and, ﬁnally, we assess the robustness of our results.
4.1. Steady state analysis
In section 3 we calibrated the model to reﬂect the structure of a typical EMU
member state. In the benchmark scenario, both countries are symmetric. In our
three policy scenarios, we changed the labor market framework to reproduce the
impact of labor market reforms. The steady state values of the four scenarios
are presented in Table 1. As labor market reforms are imposed in the domestic
country, only, and due to zero net-exports and constant consumption preference
parameters, the foreign country remains at the benchmark steady state values
in all of our scenarios. In the ﬁrst policy scenario, we decreased vacancy post-
ing costs for the tradable goods sector. As mentioned earlier, a reduction in
regulatory requirements for the posting of workers reduces the vacancy posting
costs for ﬁrms. This aﬀects primarily the tradable-goods sector, as two-thirds
of posted workers are employed there. The second policy scenario discusses a
situation in which the domestic country has a higher replacement ratio. Krause
and Uhlig (2012), among others, consider the reduction of the replacement rate
and the regime shift from earnings-dependent to an earnings-independent sys-
tem as crucial for explaining the large drop in unemployment in Germany.9 In
our third policy scenario, we follow Fahr and Sunde (2009), who analyze the
increase in matching eﬃciency related to the German labor market reforms.
The calibration of the model to the characteristics of a typical EMU member
states results in a low threshold productivity of 0.25, which implies that there
are nearly zero endogenous job-separations. In the model of Zanetti (2011)
which reproduces the structural characteristics of the UK economy, the thresh-
old productivity is much higher due to lower vacancy posting and ﬁring costs.
In the ﬁrst policy scenario, we decrease the vacancy posting costs by 25 per
cent for the tradable goods sector. In the second column of Table 1, we see an
increase in wages of both sectors which easily follows from equation (38) and
an boost in the threshold productivity for job-separations which follows from
equation (37). The increase in the threshold productivity is sizeable but, given
the productivity distribution, has only minor eﬀects on total job separations.
The most important impact of a reduction in vacancy posting costs is on the job
9We assumed an increase in the replacement rate for technical reasons. This enables us to
analyze the other labor market reform measures at a low endogenous separation steady state
that the calibration of the core countries of EMU implies. This is important, as we believe
that a reduction of the replacement rate has an immediate impact on the economy, while a
change in regulations and an increase in the matching eﬃciency follows.
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creation condition of the tradable sector (equation 35). Consequently, the num-
ber of matches increases for the tradable sector and unemployment decreases.
Given that preferences do not change, the output of both sectors increases.
In our second policy scenario, we assume that the replacement rate of the
domestic country increases by 5 percentage points compared to the benchmark
replacement rate. The domestic country experiences higher wages following
directly from the wage bargaining equation (38), an increase in the threshold
productivity due to the job destruction condition and an increase in endogenous
separations as the threshold productivity raises. An increase in separations, in
general, increases the necessity for ﬁrms to post vacancies. The value of a
vacancy, nevertheless, is decreasing, which results in an opposing eﬀect, i.e.
lowering the probability of ﬁrms to open new positions. In our model, the latter
eﬀect dominates, thereby, reducing the number of vacancies. The unemployment
rate rises due to decreasing employment. Both a decreasing number of vacancies
and an increase in the unemployment rate reduces labor market tightness.
In our third policy scenario we increase the matching eﬃciency by 5 percent-
age points which increases the number of matches given the number of vacancies
and the number of unemployed workers. As it becomes more likely for a ﬁrm
to ﬁll a position, the costs for a match decrease. Given the job destruction
condition, this implies an increase in the threshold productivity as the value
of a match is constant while the costs of opening and ﬁlling positions decline.
The total job destruction rate increases, which implies an increase in transi-
tions to unemployment. But the latter is compensated as workers have a higher
probability to ﬁnd a job and spend less time in unemployment spells. As out-
put increases, the real wage stays constant due to the fact that the bargaining
position of workers is not aﬀected by an increase in matching eﬃciency.
Table 1 on page 31 about here
4.2. Shock responses
In this section, we discuss the impulse responses to a positive domestic tech-
nology shock, a negative foreign technology shock, a monetary policy shock and
a time-preference shock aﬀecting households living in the domestic economy.
In Figures 1 and 2, we see the response of the model to a positive technology
shock on tradable good production of one standard deviation is visualized. On
impact, output and employment in the tradable sector increases while inﬂation
of home-produced tradables declines. As the value of a match increases, the
threshold productivity declines and workers that used to be ﬁred because their
productivity is below the steady state threshold remain employed. This is ex-
actly the reason why the average productivity of a worker and transitions from
employment in the tradables sector to unemployment decline. As the technology
shock aﬀects the tradable sector of the economy, only, a price drop in tradables
decreases the price relation of tradable to non-tradable goods and households
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shift consumption towards tradables. Experiencing a drop in demand, the rev-
enue of ﬁrms in the non-tradables sector declines, increasing the productivity
threshold for continuing employment in this sector and boost transitions from
non-tradable employment to unemployment.
In this model, wages are bargained in the second stage of a two-stage ap-
proach. Average wages in the non-tradable sector increase as costs stay constant
and the average productivity of a worker is rising. The impact on average wages
in the tradables sector, however, is not clear. As total factor productivity in-
creases, there is a positive stimulus on the average wage. The marginal costs,
nevertheless, decline, serving as a negative stimulus as does a decline in the
average productivity so that we observe a tiny reduction in average wages of
the tradable sector. A reduction in the average real wage does not aﬀect the
likelihood of accepting a position in the tradable sector. As vacancies of trad-
able ﬁrms increase and vacancies of non-tradable ﬁrms decline, the probability
of becoming employed in the tradable sector increases. Households living in
the foreign economy experience a drop in tradable good prices produced in
the domestic economy. Given irrevocably ﬁxed exchange rates in the currency
union, they shift consumption towards these goods, increasing net imports and,
therefore, the debt of their country. In sum, the production of tradables in the
home country increases and the demand for these products in the home and
foreign country. As overall prices decrease in the home country, households can
consume more goods.
All of our four scenarios follow the pattern just sketched. In the scenario
indicated by a dotted line where unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁve percentage
points higher than in the benchmark scenario, indicated by a continuous line,
we observe a stronger increase in employment (Figures 1 and 2). This eﬀect
results from a stronger drop in endogenous job destruction. As we see in Table
1, the steady state of this scenario is characterized by a high job destruction rate,
implying more endogenous job-separations than in the other scenarios. Given
these steady state values, a drop in the threshold productivity results in a much
stronger decline of endogenous job-separations than in the other scenarios. As
a ﬁrm in the tradable sector is able to ﬁll positions by reducing endogenous
separations, it posts more positions in the ﬁrst periods and keeps workers for a
longer time which, in turn, results in reduced posting activities in later periods.
Given that the impact on employment is stronger, and due to the fact that
labor is the sole production factor, output in the tradable-sector is higher in this
scenario. With a higher output, the impact on prices is greater. Both results in
a stronger shift from non-tradable to tradable consumption and in an increase
in demand for tradables from the foreign country resulting in higher debt there.
We observe endogenous steady state job separations due to the calibration of
our model. Decreasing the unemployment beneﬁts further would be misleading
as the impact of this institutional change works through the channel of net-
separations. As net-separations are close to zero for any replacement rate equal
or lower the the steady state value of 0.5, the impact of a decrease of the
replacement rate would be minor. That is why we decided to present an increase
in the replacement rate rather than a decrease observed in recent labor market
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reforms.10 The impact of a reduction in unemployment beneﬁts can, therefore,
easily dwarf the other labor market reforms if endogenous steady state job-
separations strongly decline but may also be minor if endogenous steady state
separations are already close to zero.
A second policy scenario, where we increased the matching eﬃciency by ﬁve
percentage points, is indicated by a dotted / broken line (Figures 1 and 2). In
this scenario, we record a smaller but still substantial increase in the tradable
goods production compared to the scenario with an increase in the replacement
rate. Gains in production are again caused by a stronger increase in employment
compared to the benchmark scenario. The reason for this increase is a better
matching of workers, which on the one hand, reduces the time workers spend
searching for a job and, therefore, unemployment. On the other hand, the time
span of an open vacancy is reduced, which raises the value of a vacancy as ﬁlled
positions have a higher reward than open positions. As the value of a vacancy
increases, ﬁrms open more positions. Again, the increase in output necessitates
a stronger decrease in prices which, in turn, raises net exports and foreign debt.
Our third policy scenario, indicated by a broken line (Figures 1 and 2),
shows a reduction in vacancy posting costs for vacancies posted by tradable
goods producing ﬁrms. As in the scenario with an increase in matching ef-
ﬁciency, ﬁrms increase the posting of vacancies which increases employment.
The increase, nevertheless, is much smaller than in the previous scenarios since
the reduction aﬀects tradable-goods-producing-ﬁrms, only. Vacancy posting
costs, furthermore, have a smaller impact on average wages than a reduction of
the replacement rate. Again we see an improvement in the terms of trade, an
increase in net exports and an increase in foreign debt, but the impact is much
smaller than in the other policy scenarios. However, a reduction of vacancy
posting costs results in an increase in the number of posted workers. As labor
market reforms diminish the regulations on this industry, the number of posted
workers increased tremendously. From the literature on labor market reforms,
we know, that posted workers are deployed mainly in tradable industries like
manufacturing and business services, which is why we see decreased vacancy
posting costs only for tradable ﬁrms.
Figure 1 on page 32 and Figure 2 on page 33 about here
As there are reasons to assume that some countries in the Eurozone were
subject to positive technology shocks which mainly beneﬁted the tradable goods
sector (Krause and Uhlig, 2012), we are also interested in the impact of a neg-
ative technology shock that may hits the periphery of the Eurozone (Figures
3 and 4). In the benchmark scenario, the negative technology shock improves
the terms of trade of the domestic economy. Alike the scenario with a positive
10This is in line with replacement rates of EMU countries that are, except those of the EU
accession states of 2008 and 2010, all equal or greater than 0.5.
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technology shock, net exports increase and, consequently, the foreign country
experiences an increase in foreign debt. In the domestic economy, households
shift consumption from foreign tradables, where prices tend to increase, to trad-
ables of the domestic economy. In sum, the price of tradables increases, which
is the reason why households shift from tradable to non-tradable consumption.
The impact of the shock on home production is ambiguous. Demand of na-
tive households having a home preference is shrinking as households shift from
tradables to non-tradables but also increases as households shift from foreign
tradables to domestic produced tradables. Additionally, households living in the
foreign country, increase their demand for tradables produced in the domestic
economy. It is, therefore, likely that the demand for domestic produced trad-
able increases which induces an increase in production. If production increases,
the demand for labor grows and the threshold productivity declines, reducing
the number of endogenous job separations. In contrast to the previous shock,
non tradable output is also growing and consumption has to decline because of
an increase in the overall price index. In sum, the foreign negative technology
shock increases prices and production in the home country and reduces produc-
tion of tradables in the foreign country that was initially hit by the shock. As
net imports from the domestic economy increase, foreign households increase
debt.
Labor market reforms, again, aﬀect the pattern of adjustment to a macroe-
conomic shock. Employment is falling with an increase in the replacement rate.
If we consider that labor market reforms tend to reduce the replacement rate, a
reduction in the replacement rate is the only reform measure reducing the debt
of the foreign country. Again, like in the scenarios with a technology shock,
an increase in the matching eﬃciency has a stronger eﬀect than decreasing job
creation costs. This is, however, true for the ﬁrst 31 periods and turns around
thereafter. From the 42nd period on, the increase in employment is higher in the
vacancy cost reduction scenario than in all other scenarios. A similar pattern
holds for unemployment, which turns round already in the 30nd period.
Given the tradable / non-tradable price relation, adjustment is faster in
the vacancy posting scenario than in all other scenarios. The reason for this
pattern is that ﬁrms in the tradable sector post more positions than in the other
scenarios which, over time, turns into an increase in employment. The other
sectors rely less on job separations than on a rising number of new matches. This
holds especially for the scenario were we have an increase in the replacement
rate. For the foreign country, a ﬂexible adjustment in the tradable sector of the
domestic economy comes at the cost of higher debt. While debt in the scenario
of reduced vacancy posting costs was below that of the scenario with an increase
in the replacement rate, this changes after 35 periods. Given that the increase
in employment and production for the home tradable sector is ongoing and net
exports stay above the value of all other scenarios, foreign debt will increase
further. A deregulation of the posting of worker industry, therefore, is likely to
result in increasing debt of non-reforming countries if those countries are subject
to negative technology shocks. This eﬀect overtakes the impact of a reduction
in the replacement rate and will dominate the overall impact of labor market
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reforms.
Figure 3 on page 34 and Figure 4 on page 35 about here
Figure 5 shows the impact of both, a time preference shock in the domestic
country and of a monetary policy shock on the debt of the foreign country. As
expected, a monetary policy shock has no impact on debt in the benchmark
case. As monetary policy aﬀects both countries in the monetary union, there
is no reason for adjusting net exports, which also implies that debt of the for-
eign country remains unaﬀected. If the domestic country raises its matching
eﬃciency, debt of the domestic country increases. As in the scenarios with tech-
nology shocks, a reduction in matching frictions ampliﬁes the response of the
economy to macroeconomic shocks. As the foreign country is more stable and
does not adjust prices as the domestic country does, this induces a stronger
demand for foreign tradable goods which increases net exports of the foreign
country and increases the debt of the domestic country. The same holds true
if the domestic country increases the replacement rate, as more endogenous
job destruction makes the economy more sensitive with respect to macroeco-
nomic shocks. As labor market reforms usually reduce the replacement rate,
the reforming economy becomes more stable, which, in turn, might result in an
increase of debt of the non-reforming countries.
Finally, we analyze the impact of a time preference shock on the domestic
economy. Such a shock increases the share of income households save for the
purpose of consumption smoothing (see equation 7). As foreign households have
a higher preference for present consumption it is reasonable for them to increase
net imports and repay the debt later on. For domestic households, net exports
are treated as an riskless asset comparable to government bonds. In the wake
of the time preference shock, domestic households have to cut consumption
demand. As ﬁrms experience a drop in demand for their goods, those ﬁrms able
to alter prices, adjust. In order to be able to stay in the market, ﬁrms have to
reduce marginal costs by increasing the productivity threshold. The number of
endogenous job separations, therefore, is rising. Additionally, ﬁrms post fewer
vacancies as the value of a vacancy decreases. Both adds to an increase in
unemployment and a reduction of labor market tightness. The drop in prices is
stronger for non-tradables than for tradable goods as the prices of tradables from
the foreign country remains unaltered. The tradable good ﬁrms, nevertheless,
face an increasing demand by foreign households after the price drop. This
raises net exports and foreign debt (Figure 5). The increase in debt is larger
the scenario with an increase in the replacement rate since the productivity
threshold in the steady state is much higher here than in the other scenarios. A
further increase, therefore, aﬀects more workers and decreases employment and
production more sharply thereby enlarging the impact on debt.
Figure 5 on page 36 about here
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4.2.1. Sensitivity analysis
The results of our model clearly depend on the distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock that we calibrated in section (3). Calibrating the
model to reﬂect the properties of a typical member country of the EMU re-
sulted in a low value of endogenous job destruction. The standard deviation of
idiosyncratic productivity was 0.48, which is broadly in line with Trigari (2009).
In this section, we lower the standard deviation to 0.38, which should aﬀect the
threshold productivity, a driving force of the model.
Table 2 on page 37 about here
Reducing the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity in all sec-
tors of both countries raises the productivity threshold from 0.25 to 3. A new
value of the equilibrium threshold productivity requires a full new set of calibra-
tions. These new parameter values, yields higher steady state unemployment,
lower average real wages and a lower output. The qualitative results of the
previous section, nevertheless, stays the same. In general, the impact of labor
market reforms turns out to be stronger. The scenario with a higher replacement
rate (dotted line) is still the one with the highest impact on tradable produc-
tion and consumption and and in which the foreign debt of the foreign country
increases most strongly. The scenario with a higher matching eﬃciency (dotted
/ broken line) follows close behind. The impact of the scenario with an increase
in vacancy posting costs (broken line), nevertheless, is gaining in size and is
in its impact on output and net exports close to the scenario with an increase
in matching eﬃciency. The previously gained clear result that the replacement
rate scenario outperforms the other scenarios no longer holds. If we look at the
combined eﬀect, labor market reforms increase the debt of the foreign country
compared to the baseline, while in the previous section, the reduction of the
replacement rate had such a strong eﬀect that labor market reforms reduced
the impact of a domestic technology shock to the debt of the foreign country.
Figure 6 on page 38 about here
5. Conclusion
After the creation of the EMU, current account imbalances increased sharply
as expectations regarding growth in the periphery of the union failed to mate-
rialize (Blanchard, 2007) and both the core and the periphery of the euro area
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were hit by common and asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. In the economic
literature, there is a discussion going on concerning to what extent labor market
reforms contributed to these imbalances. In this paper, we examine the eﬀects
of three types of labor market reform measures, namely a decrease in the re-
placement rate, an increase in matching eﬃciency and a decrease of vacancy
posting costs on the foreign debt of non-reforming countries. If the reforming
country increases its current account surplus due to these reforms, some speak
of a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
The ﬁrst reform measure, a decline in the replacement rate, reduces both,
steady state unemployment and endogenous job-destruction, which is closely
related to a lower impact of shocks on output, prices and, therefore, also on net
exports and the level of foreign debt of non-reforming countries. The second re-
form measure, an increase in matching eﬃciency, in contrast, corresponds with
a higher level of foreign debt of non-reformers, as endogenous job-destruction
increases. This, in turn, ampliﬁes the impact of a shock on employment, produc-
tion and, therefore, all macroeconomic variables related to changes in prices. A
higher matching eﬃciency, thus, leads to an increase in employment and output
in the steady state, but comes at the cost of higher ﬂuctuations of output and
prices, an increase in the impact of a shock on net exports and a stronger im-
pact on the level of foreign debt of the non-reforming country. Finally, the third
reform measure, a reduction in the costs of posting a vacancy, has an impact on
the level of foreign debt on non-reformers, as the reforming country's tradable
sector is able to alter employment at lower cost and, thus, more strongly. This
in turn ampliﬁes the impact of a shock on prices, production and, therefore,
also on the foreign debt of the non-reformers.
In the case of a positive technology shock hitting a reforming country with
the characteristics of a typical EMU member, fears about a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy that leaves non-reforming countries with a loss in competitiveness and
an increase in foreign debt cannot be corroborated by us for the speciﬁc bundle
of reforms considered here. The positive eﬀect of reduction in the replacement
rate more than compensates negative spillovers from increases in matching ef-
ﬁciency and a decrease in vacancy posting costs. This does, however, not hold
for a negative productivity shock in the non-reforming country, as the second
reform measure, a reduction in vacancy posting costs in the tradable sectors,
is dominating the overall impact of labor market reforms and, thus, increasing
the foreign debt of the non-reforming country. As the impact of labor mar-
ket reforms in the latter case are small compared to the impact of a positive
technology shock in the reforming country, we do not see the danger of a beggar-
thy-neighbor policy in the case of EMU member countries reforming their labor
markets.
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Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Steady state values
Variable Benchmark
Decrease in Increase in the Increase in
vacancy posting costs replacement ratio matching eﬃciency
Output 12.96 13.01 12.89 13.07
Unemployment rate 0.095 0.090 0.10 0.087
Real wages 12.96 12.97 12.99 12.96
Tightness 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.25
Tradables
Output tradables 5.13 5.15 5.11 5.18
Vacancies 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.009
Threshold productivity 0.25 1.03 2.53 2.27
Total job destruction rate 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.0202
Non-tradables
Output non-tradables 7.82 7.85 7.78 7.89
Vacancies 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013
Threshold productivity 0.25 0.99 2.53 2.27
Total job destruction rate 0.0200 0.0200 0.0204 0.0202
Notes: Entries in this table are computed using the calibration described in section (3)
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Figure 1: Positive domestic technology shock
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Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock in the domestic coun-
try.
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the models' variables to a technology
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
33
Figure 2: Positive domestic technology shock
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Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock in the domestic coun-
try.
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the models' variables to a technology
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
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Figure 3: Negative foreign technology shock
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Impulse response functions to a negative technology shock in the foreign country.
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the models' variables to a technology
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
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Figure 4: Negative foreign technology shock
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Impulse response functions to a negative technology shock in the foreign country.
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the models' variables to a technology
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
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Figure 5: Monetary policy shock
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Impulse response functions to a monetary-policy and a time-preference shock in
the union / domestic country.
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the models' variables to a technology
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
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Table 2: Steady state values sensitivity analysis
Variable Benchmark
Decrease in Increase in the Increase in
vacancy posting costs matching eﬃciency replacement ratio
Output 12.56 12.60 12.63 12.53
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.095 0.095 0.11
Real wages 12.03 12.04 12.04 12.05
Tightness 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.31
Tradables
Output tradables 4.91 4.92 4.94 4.90
Vacancies 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.007
Threshold productivity 3,00 3,66 4,16 4,41
Total job destruction rate 0.02 0.02 0.0201 0.0201
Non-tradables
Output non-tradables 7.65 7.67 7.69 7.64
Vacancies 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011
Threshold productivity 3,00 3,66 4,16 4,41
Total job destruction rate 0.0200 0.0200 0.0201 0.0201
Notes: Entries in this table are computed using the calibration described in Section 4.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-3 Unemployment (absolute)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Vacancies (tradable sector)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Debt (foreign county)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Consumption
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Tradable output
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10-5 Tradable output (foreign country)
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
• Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
• Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
• Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
• Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
• Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
